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1. Introduction  
Since its translation to English, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014; Capital 
hereafter) has become an intensely debated topic among economists. It has also become a 
bestseller (it was number one on Amazon.com’s for some time) well beyond this circle. The book 
has received generally favourable reviews2  and it has already been compared by some 
commentators to the major works of Smith, Marx and Keynes. 
The book is the outcome of years of fruitful collaboration between many researchers who 
collected data on the distribution of income and wealth across several countries, the 
characteristics of this wealth and its evolution (Piketty, 2003; Atkinson & Piketty, 2006; Alvaredo 
& Saez, 2009; Atkinson et al., 2011). Not only is this data novel, it often go back well into the 19th 
century. The book’s sweeping historical approach stands out in the field of economics, which 
otherwise treats economic history as a distraction rather than a source of economic knowledge. 
The English translation of the book is timely, given the contemporary interest in these topics in 
the US and other countries. That reason, together with the fact that it is written in an accessible 
style, has contributed to the resounding success of the book – especially the English version. 
Capital not only presents new data; it also uses this empirical evidence to develop a theoretical 
framework that, at the risk of simplifying, comprises “two fundamental laws” as well as an 
additional one, labelled by Piketty as the “fundamental contradiction of capitalism” (FCC). The 
focus of this paper is exclusively on the latter, but the other two deserve some brief comments. 
The first fundamental law states that the share of capital income in total income, 
𝑃
𝑌
,  equals the 
rate of return on wealth, 𝑟, times the capital stock (wealth)-to-income ratio, 𝑘, so 
𝑃
𝑌
= 𝑟. 𝑘.3 
Several commentators (Homburg, 2014; Milanovic, 2013; Ray, 2014) have noted that this “law” 
is simply an accounting identity and that, unless one posits some causality from the right-hand 
side to the left-hand side of the equation, the expression is empty of any behavioural content. 
Commentators have also highlighted the imprecise nature of 𝑘, which Piketty sometimes calls 
“capital” but at times “wealth” – and which is measured at market value. We agree with both 
points, but we will not need them here for the following discussion. On the other hand, the 
second fundamental law shows that the wealth-income ratio, 𝑘, is equal to the (average) 
propensity to save, 𝑠, divided by the growth rate of income, 𝑔, so 𝑘 =
𝑠
𝑔
 . This expression is not 
an accounting identity, but rather a possible rearrangement of the Harrod-Domar equilibrium 
solution and hence it will only be fulfilled in a long-run equilibrium. Krusell & Smith (2014) have 
expressed reservations about the way Piketty takes depreciation into account depreciation 
(rightly so in our view), but we will not enter into this debate either. Finally, the FCC states that 
empirically the rate of return on capital has been higher than the growth rate of the economy. 
Because Piketty amalgamates very different assets (equities, bonds, gold, real estate) into the 
notion of wealth, it should be noted that this rate of return is neither a rate of interest nor a rate 
of profit, but rather an average rate of return on the total capital of the economy. 
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How do all these laws fit into a coherent explanation of capitalism? Summers (2014) provides a 
concise summary about the place of the laws in Piketty’s argument: ‘[h]is argument is that 
capital or wealth grows at the rate of return to capital, a rate that normally exceeds the 
economic growth rate. Thus, economies will tend to have ever-increasing ratios of wealth to 
income, barring huge disturbances like wars and depressions. Since wealth is highly 
concentrated, it follows that inequality will tend to increase without bound until a policy change 
is introduced or some kind of catastrophe interferes with wealth accumulation.’ Therefore, in 
the first step the fundamental inequality causes a rises in the wealth-income ratio, which in a 
second step induces a rise in the share of capital in total income. Finally, because ‘wealth is 
highly concentrated’, personal income distribution becomes more inegalitarian due to these 
macroeconomic forces.4 As we will explain below, these conclusions are in part given by the fact 
that Piketty is reasoning within the neoclassical growth model, where the rate of profit is given 
by a “production function” and, implicitly, full employment is assumed. Therefore, there is no 
role for demand in determining the rate of profit.  
Therefore, the importance of the FCC for the argument of the book is unquestionable, and it can 
arguably be regarded as its most important theoretical tenet: ‘[t]his fundamental inequality, 
which I will write as r > g [...] will play a crucial role in this book. In a sense, it sums up the overall 
logic of my conclusions’ (Piketty, 2014, p. 25, emphasis added). In fact, the FCC makes its 
appearance very early in the book: ‘[w]hen the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of 
growth of output and income [...] capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and 
unsustainable inequalities’ (p. 1, emphasis added). However, unlike the “two fundamental 
laws”, it is not clear whether the FCC is a logical or an empirical argument. Sometimes Piketty 
argues as if it were a logical argument: ‘[w]hen the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds 
the growth rate of the economy [...] then it logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster 
than output and income’ (2014, p. 26). But these passages are mixed with others where he 
adduces empirical reasons: ‘[t]o be clear, I take this to be a historical fact, not a logical necessity 
(2014, p. 353)’.  
In this paper, we will deal with the theoretical aspect of Piketty’s argument and we will not 
discuss the empirical contribution of the book. We make four points. First, r > g is not 
necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty falls 
prey to the fallacy of composition when he says that the necessary condition for r>g is that 
capitalists save most of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesian economists can learn from 
Piketty’s insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. 
Finally, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production 
function does not exist and it therefore cannot explain the distribution of income. 
Many of the previous conclusions arise from the fact that Piketty does not give sufficient 
consideration to the issues of aggregate demand and its effects on income distribution. In other 
words, there is no indication of the work of Keynes or Cambridge post-Keynesians informing the 
argument of this book. The absence of post-Keynesian theory is, if frustrating, perhaps not 
surprising, given that contemporary mainstream economics, which is Piketty’s point of 
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departure, has become theoretically increasingly narrow. Post-Keynesian growth models and 
the Cambridge Capital Controversies have been expunged from the canon of economic 
knowledge.5 The absence of Keynes in his book is more surprising, because Piketty and Keynes 
share a basic social liberal vision. Both defend the market system and private property.  In short, 
for both Piketty and Keynes, capitalism is the best economic and social system, but both think 
that strong government intervention is needed. Still, we find hardly any mention of Keynes in 
Piketty’s book and, indeed, there is no discussion of effective demand, which the book seems to 
consider relevant for the short run only.6 While Keynes regarded unemployment and the 
instability of effective demand as the main problem of capitalism, Piketty regards the 
polarisation of income distribution as the main issue. While both want to improve capitalism, 
Keynes tried to save capitalism from itself (by stabilising the level of employment), but Piketty 
tries to save society from the rising wealth inequality arising from unfettered capitalism.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple Cambridge model and 
shows why Piketty’s FCC does not prove anything about the dynamics of the profit share in total 
income. Section 3 digs into the intuition as to why the FCC is compatible with a constant profit 
share, showing how Piketty succumbs to the fallacy of composition when he explains the 
importance of the macroeconomic rate of return as if it were a rate of reinvestment. Section 4 
carries the analysis a step further by considering what happens to personal income distribution. 
It shows that Piketty’s intuition is correct and that traditional post-Keynesian models have 
already considered the possibility of a group of individuals accumulating faster than others – 
even in a steady-state. Section 5 questions whether assuming an aggregate production function 
is useful in the context of explaining income distribution. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The simple Cambridge model 
The post-Keynesian school already developed a theoretical framework that dealt with the 
problems of income distribution, economic growth and the determination of the profit rate in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Kaldor, 1955; Robinson, 1956; Kahn, 1959; Pasinetti, 1962).7 Although the 
model was originally developed as the Keynesian answer to Harrod and Domar’s challenge 
about the instability of the long-run growth path,8 it was later refined and augmented with new 
features (Kaldor, 1966; Steedman, 1972; Palley, 1996; Lavoie, 1998) that have confirmed the 
validity of the main insights of the basic model.9 
The other well-known answer to the Harrod-Domar problem was the neoclassical solution, put 
forward in a couple of seminal papers by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). For our purposes, the 
neoclassical explanation of income distribution envisions the whole economy working as an 
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 For instance Acemoglu (2009), which can be regarded as the reference in neoclassical economic growth, does not 
have a chapter to address the debate – and it is certainly not a short book. 
6
 On page 135 Piketty (2014) discusses Keynes’ euthanasia of the rentier; p. 220 notes that Keynes regarded the wage 
share as stable and p. 232 refers to Keynes in passing when discussing the development of growth theory.  
7
 For an analysis of the post-Keynesian framework with Marxist features, see Harris (1975). 
8
 However, it should be noted that these contributions do not really address Harrod’s concerns about the instability of 
the warranted growth path and discrepancies between warranted and natural growth rates. These Harrodian 
concerns have been addressed elsewhere – e.g. Skott (1989). 
9
 For a thorough survey, see Baranzini & Mirante (2013). 
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“aggregate production function”, where total output is related in a precise mathematical way to 
several inputs or “factors of production” – labour and capital. Given perfectly competitive 
markets (and assuming full employment), the price of every factor is determined by scarcity 
(supply and demand) and the factors are paid their marginal product – given by the technology 
of the economy. Finally, because of the behavioural assumption that investment equals to 
savings, no problem of effective demand arises in the model.   
Piketty uses neoclassical growth theory. Assuming an aggregate production function, he argues 
that the return on capital is given by technology.10 We will return to his theory of income 
distribution in section V and replicate the post-Keynesian criticism of the very existence of an 
aggregate production function.  
In the Cambridge model the rate of profit and the functional income distribution are given by an 
entirely different set of conditions. If differs from the neoclassical models because there is an 
investment function distinct from the savings function. Investment is determined independent 
of savings; not all savings are automatically reinvested. Post-Keynesians often think of 
investment as driven by “animal spirits” (i.e., some considerations not reducible to rational 
optimisation) and argue that because of fundamental uncertainty these animal spirits also 
matter in the long run. The second ingredient is a dual-class structure, with capitalists and 
workers. Capitalists make investment decisions and have different savings propensities from 
workers. While the class structure is a major difference to the representative agent approach of 
neoclassical theory, it is clearly recognised by Piketty, who, however, does not indicate a belief 
in the notion that changes in distribution matter for saving or investment decisions. 
This basic model abstracts from government and a foreign sector, which is in line with Piketty, 
who also ignores these sectors on empirical grounds for his long-run analysis.11 In this economy, 
workers receive both wages and profits, while capitalists receive only profits, so the investment-
saving identity can be written as: 
 𝐼 =  𝑠𝑤 . (𝑊 + 𝑃𝑤) + 𝑠𝑐 . 𝑃𝑐  
In this equation 𝐼 is investment, 𝑊 is wages, 𝑃𝑤 is workers’ profits, 𝑃𝑐 is capitalists’ profits and 
𝑠𝑤 and 𝑠𝑐  are the propensities to save of workers and (pure) capitalists respectively, and 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑤 < 𝑠𝑐 ≤ 1. It can be shown
12 that the previous equation can yield expressions both for 
the rate of profit, 𝑟, and the profit share in total income, 
𝑃
𝑌
: 
 𝑟 =  
1
𝑠𝑐
.
𝐼
𝐾
  
                                                          
10
 Most of these references can be found from pages 212 to 217 and 220 to 222. Piketty & Zucman (2014) discuss 
these issues in length. 
11
 Regarding the net position of foreign capital, ‘when we compare the structure of national capital in the eighteenth 
century to its structure now, we find that net foreign assets play a negligible role in both periods [...] the total capital 
stock has remained more or less unchanged relative to national income (p. 122). On the other hand, ‘the history of 
the ratio of national capital to national income in France and Britain since the eighteenth century [...] has largely been 
the history of the relation between private capital and national income’ (p. 126). 
12
 See Kaldor (1955-56), Moore (1974) and Pasinetti (1974, pp. 270–272).The original proof, proposed by Kaldor 
(1955-56), was corrected by Pasinetti (1962) taking into account properly the share of profits accrued to workers. 
However, Pasinetti assumes in this proof that the rate of interest equals the rate profit. Moore (1974) has shown that 
such an assumption is not needed for the argument. 
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 𝑃
𝑌
 =  
1
𝑠𝑐
.
𝐼
𝐾
.
𝐾
𝑌
 
 
In a steady-state situation, where all variables grow at the same rate, the growth of the 
economy, 𝑔, has to equal the growth rate of capital, 
𝐼
𝐾
.13 Substituting in both expressions and 
letting к to be the capital-output ratio, we get: 
 𝑟 =  
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
 (1) 
 𝑃
𝑌
 =  
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
. к  
(2) 
These expressions have become known as the “Cambridge post-Keynesian theory of 
distribution”. For our purposes here, equation (1) says that the rate of profit depends on the 
growth rate of income and the capitalists’ propensity to save. It is interesting to note that the 
previous expression is independent of technology (i.e., the capital-output ratio or “production 
function”) and the workers’ propensity to save.14 Therefore, the return on capital is something 
not ‘unpredictable and arbitrary’ (Piketty, 2014, pp. 26–27), but can be explained with respect to 
particular factors of a capitalist economy. 
The remarkable aspect of the Cambridge formulation is that it shows that the famous inequality 
𝑟 > 𝑔 is not just a possible outcome in a capitalist economy, but rather an outcome which is to 
be expected; except for the limit case 𝑠𝑐 = 1, the rate of profit will always be higher than the 
growth rate of the economy, casting well-founded doubts about alternative theories (Diamond, 
1965) where the opposite inequality, 𝑟 < 𝑔 (called in these formulations dynamic inefficiency)15 
is theoretically equally valid and stands on the same footing.16 
Of course, one can still argue that this inequality between the rate of return and the growth rate 
is a “fundamental law of capitalism” (and we think it is!), but its implications for the functional 
income distribution between wages and profits are weaker than Piketty claims. In fact, equation 
(1) holds for any steady-state equilibrium, where both the share of wages and the share of 
profits in national income remain constant, as equation (2) shows; in other words, it is perfectly 
possible to have, at the same time, a permanently constant income distribution with a rate of 
profit higher than the growth rate of the economy. The economic intuition for this outcome will 
be explained in the following section, but in the meantime we can try to readjust Piketty’s 
inequality to show the true interval under which a certain rate of profit will be unequivocally 
associated with an increasing divergence between the profit and the wage share. This will 
happen when equation (3) holds:  
                                                          
13
 Many people implicitly assume that these conditions are only valid for a full-employment situation. However, this 
assumption is misleading: this condition can be fulfilled even in a situation of less than full employment, as long as all 
the individual components of the economic system keep a constant proportion between them through time.  
14
 This result (the Independence of the profit rate to the workers’ propensity to save) is known as Pasinetti’s theorem. 
15
 For a treatment of the dynamic inefficiency in a Keynesian framework with demand problems and secular 
stagnation, see Skott & Ryoo (2012). 
16
 The fact that the rate of profit is greater than growth rate of the economy will hold even in an economy with 
government activity, where the relevant profit rate is now net of taxes. See Steedman (1972), Pasinetti (1989) and 
Dalziel (1991) for a summary of the points. See Piketty (2014, pp. 356-357) for the empirical evidence presented 
there. 
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 𝑟 >  
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
 (3) 
Therefore, as long as the profit rate is higher than the growth rate of the economy divided by 
the capitalists’ propensity to save, we can claim categorically that there will be a redistribution 
of income from wages to profits, because wages and profits will grow at the same rate only 
when equation (1) is fulfilled. Note that this new “hurdle rate” is higher than Piketty’s, because 
now the growth rate is divided by a variable whose value is less than one – one could think, as a 
rough empirical approximation, that with 𝑠𝑐 = 0.5 the new hurdle rate will be double the 
original one.17 What would happen in this scenario is that the profit rate (the main source of 
savings in this economy) would be too high to finance all the required investments, 𝑔, to keep a 
steady-state equilibrium position. Indeed, from the previous remarks it follows that even a 
falling profit share is compatible with Piketty’s inequality 𝑟 > 𝑔, as long as the profit rate falls in 
the following interval: 
𝑔 <  𝑟 <  
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
 
We would like to highlight again that we are criticising Piketty’s FCC simplistic logic that ‘[w]hen 
the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy [...] then it 
logically follows that inherited wealth grows faster than output and income’ (2014, p. 26, 
emphasis added). It is just in this case (when someone wants to claim a unequivocal outcome in 
Piketty’s inequality) when Piketty’s inequality 𝑟 > 𝑔 has to be replaced by our inequality (3). 
Simply put, Piketty’s inequality is a weak, non sequitur condition (for instance, we could observe 
a rate of return higher than the growth rate and still not to give a verdict about functional 
distribution), while inequality (3) delimits the unequivocal range under which the mechanisms 
for a changing income distribution between wages and profits begin to operate. 
 
3. Functional income distribution and a fallacy of composition for the rate 
of return 
Even if the reader accepts the previous reasoning in full, the intuition that a rate of profit higher 
than the growth rate of the economy will not automatically entail a more unequal income 
distribution may be hard to accept. Nevertheless, we will show now how Piketty, in his 
arguments concerning this issue, commits a logical slip or falls into the fallacy of composition. 
Once this is corrected, the dynamics of capital accumulation in capitalist economies can be 
properly understood. 
In its most basic sense, we might say that the error comes from the absence of any role for 
effective demand. In the history of economic thought, we see that issues surrounding effective 
demand are possible sources of confusion. The most cited one is probably related to the 
reduction of wages during a recession and its relationship to unemployment. From a manager’s 
point of view it makes sense to reduce “costs”; from a macroeconomic point of view, it leads to 
a loss of purchasing power because wages are a cost and a source of purchasing power at the 
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 There is an extensive empirical Kaleckian literature that indicates savings differentials in that order of magnitude. 
See Naastepad & Storm (2007), Hein & Vogel (2008), Stockhammer & Stehrer (2011) and Onaran & Galanis ( 2012).  
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same time (Keynes, 1936, Ch. 19). The fallacy of composition regarding the rate of profit can be 
regarded as another instance of this paradox. 
The argument is as follows. Throughout the book, Piketty (2014) blends explanations about the 
fate of individual fortunes with explanations that deal with pure macroeconomic logic.18 
Instances of a micro-based logic abound throughout the book, as exemplified in the following 
two sentences:19 
‘Consider a world of low growth, on the order of, say, 0.5–1 percent a year [...] The 
rate of return on capital, which is generally on the order of 4 or 5 percent a year, is 
therefore much higher than the growth rate. Concretely, this means that wealth 
accumulated in the past is recapitalized much more quickly than the economy 
grows, even when there is no income from labor’ (p. 351, emphasis added). 
‘The law of cumulative growth is essentially identical to the law of cumulative 
returns, which says that an annual rate of return of a few percent, compounded 
over several decades, automatically results in a very large increase of the initial 
capital, provided that the return is constantly reinvested, or at a minimum that only 
a small portion of it is consumed by the owner of the capital (small in comparison 
with the growth rate of the society in question)’ (pp. 75–77, emphasis in the 
original). 
These sentences are true for an individual capitalist (if he saves more he will be able to reinvest 
at a higher pace), but they are not true for the capitalist class as a whole. If one goes back and 
inspects equation (1) again one will realise that a higher capitalist saving rate is associated with a 
lower profit rate, and not vice versa. Indeed, it is only when the capitalist class as a whole 
decides to save all of their income, when 𝑠𝑐 → 1, that the rate of profit will tend to 𝑟 → 𝑔. 
Therefore, Piketty’s fears about functional income inequality associated with higher saving rates 
are unfounded because it is precisely in this case that Piketty’s inequality will not hold.  
Another way to state this is that, contrary to what Piketty believes (and the two previous 
quotations are a clear example of this), at the macroeconomic level the rate of return is not a 
recapitalisation rate. This is because in order to attain such high rates of return, the sine qua non 
condition is that capitalists have to consume a large part of their income – otherwise the profit 
rate would be equal to the growth rate. The Cambridge equation boils down this idea to its 
essentials, showing that capital is growing at 𝑔 but at the same time that it is compatible with a 
rate of profit of 
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
: the difference is precisely the capitalists’ consumption out of their income.  
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 The best examples of the latter are the graphs presented in several chapters (e.g. graphs 10.7 to 10.11) that deal 
with the relationship between the growth rate and the rate of return. 
19
 We would not like to give the impression that we have picked a couple of sentences out of context. Although the 
reader can check for himself/herself the context of the statements presented above, we would like to present a small 
sample of passages that share the same principles: ‘People with inherited wealth need save only a portion of their 
income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly than the economy as a whole’ (Piketty, 2014, p. 26). ‘If one 
saves more, because one’s fortune is large enough to live well while consuming somewhat less of one’s annual rent, 
then one’s fortune will increase more rapidly than the economy, and inequality of wealth will tend to increase even if 
one contributes no income from labor’ (p. 351) and  ‘a more patient society, or one that anticipates future shocks, will 
of course amass greater reserves and accumulate more capital’ (p. 359). 
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These arguments are deeply rooted in the seminal works of the post-Keynesian tradition, 
especially those of Kalecki (1954, 1962, 1971). When Kalecki derived his famous “profit 
equation”, he concluded that ‘[i]t is clear that capitalists may decide to consume and to invest 
more in a given period than in the preceding one, but they cannot decide to earn more. It is, 
therefore, their investment and consumption decisions which determine profits, and not vice 
versa (Kalecki, 1971, p.78-79). So, as a class, capitalists ‘are masters of their fate’ (Kalecki, 1962). 
In fact, our previous discussion can be regarded as a sort of dynamic version of the Kalecki-
Kaldor-Robinson’s insight that ‘workers spend what they earn and the capitalists earn what they 
spend’. This simple but important “Kaleckian” insight has passed unnoticed so far in the most 
prominent reviews of Piketty’s book (Krugman, 2014; Milanovic, 2013; Solow, 2014; Summers, 
2014). For instance, Solow, who should have first-hand knowledge of these issues from his 
involvement in the Cambridge Capital Controversies in the 1960s, simply states that ‘[s]o far as I 
know, no one before him has made this connection [...] [t]his is Piketty’ main point, and his new 
and powerful contribution to an old topic: as long as the rate of return exceeds the rate of 
growth, the income and wealth of the rich will grow faster than the typical income from work’ 
(Solow, 2014). The rest of the commentators follow similar lines.20  Even eminent post-
Keynesians economists (e.g., Palley, 2014; Taylor, 2014) have not highlighted the fallacy of 
composition in Piketty’s analysis.  
The next section will present the implications of the argument for personal income distribution.  
 
4. Some implications for personal income distribution 
We have presented theoretical arguments explain why Piketty’s FCC does not have the 
implications derived by the author. However, we should point out that nothing in our reasoning 
precludes the possibility of increases in the profit share leading to divergences in the fates of 
individual fortunes (the second logical chain in Summer’s words); in fact, this very possibility was 
already discussed in the literature of the Cambridge model (Pasinetti, 1974, Chapter 6), although 
its implications at that time were not appreciated. We will argue that a stable labor-capital split 
is perfectly compatible with an increasing unequal personal distribution. In other words, we will 
show how Piketty’s insights can enrich the traditional Cambridge framework.   
In the Cambridge model, the term 𝑠𝑐 can be regarded as a weighted arithmetic mean of the 
propensity to save of different capitalist groups, where the weights are the capital shares of 
each capitalist group in total capital. So, in general, in a system with 𝑛 capitalist groups, 𝑠𝑐 will 
be different from 𝑠𝑐
𝑛, where the superscript now denotes the propensity to save of the capitalist 
group 𝑛. For a macroeconomic profit rate given by 
𝑔
𝑠𝑐
, individual capitalist groups will be able to 
reinvest their savings at that rate. But because in general 𝑠𝑐
1 ≠ 𝑠𝑐
2 ≠ 𝑠𝑐
3 and so on, the capitalist 
group with the highest 𝑠𝑐 will be able to accumulate at a faster pace than its peers; its thrifty 
behaviour will be detrimental to the overall profit rate, but this will be compensated by the less 
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 Krugman, who likes to be regarded as “listening to the gentiles”, and cites Kalecki every now and then, does not 
mention any problem with the FCC (Krugman, 2014). On the other hand, Summers (2014) puts an example about the 
owner-occupied housing imputed rents, arguing that all these rents are consumed rather than reinvested, which 
could create problems to Piketty’s FCC – because if they were reinvested we would be back, according to him, in 
Piketty’s argument. 
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frugal behaviour of its peers, who will raise the overall profit rate but at the expense of a lower 
level of accumulation at their individual level.21 
The previous explanation is in essence Piketty’s, and it is at the individual level that it is correct. 
At this level, the profit rate (if is totally reinvested) is a recapitalisation rate, and then it can be 
argued that people with different initial capital and different saving behaviour will accumulate at 
different paces. In fact, this debate was a central part of the Cambridge Capital Controversies 
regarding the range22 in which the Cambridge equation was valid (Pasinetti, 1962; Kaldor, 1966; 
Samuelson & Modigliani, 1966), but not regarding its implications for the personal income 
distribution. However, Piketty’s conclusion was already presented as the theoretical outcome of 
the Cambridge model at the individual level by, for instance, Pasinetti: 
‘[T]he analysis may also be generalized to many groups of savers [...] It can be 
seen immediately that only one group of capitalists will eventually dominate the 
equilibrium growth path. For, as soon as more than one group of capitalists is 
introduced […], the growth rate of the capital stock owned by the thriftiest group 
emerges as being higher than the growth rate of any other capitalists’ group. 
Therefore, growth being exponential, the thriftiest group of capitalists will in the 
end dominate all the others’ (Pasinetti, 1974, p. 141). 
In summary, we are in favour of Piketty’s conclusion about the dynamics of personal income 
distribution, but as long as no logical connection is made to his macroeconomic theory. We have 
shown in Section 3 that even a declining profit share is compatible with 𝑟 > 𝑔, and that this in 
turn is compatible with an increasing unequal personal distribution. 
 
5. The theory of income distribution and the need for a fourth “Capital 
Controversy” 
Piketty argues that the functional distribution of income is ultimately determined by 
technological factors. Following the neoclassical theory of income distribution, the return to 
capital is the marginal product of capital. Piketty’s relation to the marginal productivity theory of 
income distribution, however, is a complicated one. While he endorses it as an explanation of 
functional income distribution, he devotes a whole chapter (chapter 9) to criticising it as an 
explanation of personal income distribution, in particular the income of the super-rich. Rather 
than changes in technology, changes in taxation, in corporate governance and in labour market 
institutions have been driving personal inequality. But when it comes to factor shares and the 
return to capital, technology and marginal products rule again.23 24 
                                                          
21
 Over time, if this dynamic persists, the relevant propensity to save will be then that associated with the thriftiest 
capitalist group, which behaviour dominates in the expression of the Cambridge equation. See Pasinetti’s explanation 
below. 
22
 When originally formulated, the Cambridge model was based on the assumption that 𝑠𝑤 <
𝐼
𝑌
< 𝑠𝑐. Samuelson & 
Modigliani (1966) argued that 𝑠𝑤 ≥
𝐼
𝑌
  could be another theoretical possibility, an assumption that would undermine 
the main results of the Cambridge model. For a summary of the debate, see Pasinetti (1974, Chapter 6) 
23
 The reader may wonder how the two arguments go together. Presumably, if minimum wages have a substantial 
impact on the lower end of wage, they also would affect the wage share (Piketty argues the elasticity of substitution is 
not equal to one). There are several recent studies that highlight the role of institutional changes as determinants of 
the wage share (Kristal, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013; Bengtsson, 2014).  
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There are several problems with Piketty’s use of the aggregate production function that have 
not been raised by commentators on the book. First, Piketty uses the term ‘wealth’ and ‘capital’ 
synonymously and lumps together business capital (i.e., machinery) and the housing stock. For 
wealth that is straightforward, but as a factor of production housing is very different from 
machinery. Second, in any argument that uses a production function to explain income 
distribution the elasticity of substitution plays a key role. Piketty assumes that this elasticity is 
larger than one. Rowthorn (2014) questions the empirical validity of this and demonstrates that 
Piketty’s argument critically depends on this assumption. Third, Piketty values capital at market 
prices, and thereby potentially conflates quantity and price changes. In his discussion he 
downplays the role of valuation changes over longer periods. However, his data show that for 
many countries for several decades valuation changes are as important as accumulated savings 
in explaining the growth of the wealth-income ratio (Rognlie, 2014). 
Piketty’s (2014, p. 220) stand on the issue is best exemplified in the following sentence, where a 
theoretical argument is blended with empirical reasoning: 
Over a very long period of time, the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor seems to have been greater than one: an increase in the capital/income 
ratio β seems to have led to a slight increase in α, capital’s share of national 
income, and vice versa. Intuitively, this corresponds to a situation in which there 
are many different uses for capital in the long run. Indeed, the observed historical 
evolutions suggest that it is always possible—up to a certain point, at least—to 
find new and useful things to do with capital. 
This framework, which tries to derive income distribution from an aggregate production 
function, has been under attack at least at three different times. Two Capital Controversies took 
place at the beginning of the twentieth century. The first one was between Böhm-Bawerk, Clark, 
Fisher and Veblen; the second one, in the 1930s, was between Knight, Hayek and Kaldor.25 The 
third one, known as the “Cambridge Capital Controversies” (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003) took place 
in the 1950s and 1960s between Cambridge, UK, and Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
The Cambridge Capital Controversies are briefly mentioned with condescension by Piketty 
(2014, pp. 230-232), where he argues that ‘the virulence [...] of the Cambridge capital 
controversy was due in part to the fact that participants on both sides lacked the historical data 
needed to clarify the terms of the debate’ (Ibid. p. 232). This is misleading, because the debate 
was on logical grounds. It was about the question whether different machines and intermediate 
goods can be added up in value terms as ‘capital. More technically the question was, whether a 
multi-sector economy with a rich set of possible input technologies, which profit-maximising 
capitalists can choose from, can in a meaningful way be described by a (well behaved) aggregate 
production function. The main result was that it cannot: the same technology can be used by a 
profit-maximising economy at both high and low wages (known as capital reswitching and 
capital reversal). A rise in wages can lead to a decrease or an increase in the observed capital-
labour ratio. No general negative relationship between techniques (capital-labour ratio) and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24
 However, in an email exchange to the authors, Piketty himself has made very clear his position regarding the use of 
the neoclassical production model: ‘[a]ll I am saying is that even if the world was working as in the one-sector 
neoclassical model with perfect competition, then this would certainly does not imply that we live in an harmonious 
or desirable place in any meaningful sense.’ 
25
 Further discussion can be found in Cohen & Harcourt (2005). 
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profit rate can be derived – i.e., the demand curve for capital is not always downward sloping 
(Harcourt, 1969; King, 2002, Ch. 4). Post-Keynesians concluded that the theory of growth and 
distribution should not be premised on an aggregate production function. 
There is another strand of the literature beginning with Klein (1946), which investigates under 
what conditions it is possible to aggregate well-behaved micro production functions at the level 
of the firm (assuming they exist) into a macroeconomic production function.26 The main result is 
that ‘[e]ven under constant returns, the conditions for aggregation are so very stringent as to 
make the existence of aggregate production functions in real economies a non-event’ (Fisher, 
2005, p. 490).  
While the aggregate production function lost popularity in the neoclassical literature in the 
decade after the Cambridge Controversies, a new generation of growth models in the 1990s 
resurrected it without concern (or presumably knowledge of) the controversies. In part this may 
be due to the fact that empirical studies regularly show that aggregate production functions fit 
the data quite well. However, this is, plainly put, because studies using value data are estimating 
an accounting identity. This argument has an old pedigree (Phelps Brown, 1957; Shaikh, 1974; 
Simon & Levy, 1963), but has been proposed again several times since the 1990s (Felipe, 2000; 
Felipe & Adams, 2005). Felipe & McCombie (2003, 2006, 2013) argue that estimates of the 
aggregate production function are ‘not even wrong’ in the sense that is impossible to falsify the 
theory.  
The broader implications of the critique are serious because it ‘affects all of neoclassical applied 
aggregate work that relies in some way on well-behaved production functions and profit-
maximizing conditions: labour demand functions and NAIRU measures; investment theory; 
measures of multifactor productivity or total factor productivity growth; estimates of 
endogenous growth; theories of economic development; theories of income distribution; 
measures of output elasticities with respect to labour and capital; measures of potential output; 
theories of real business cycles; estimates of the impact of changes in the minimum wage, social 
programs, or in tax rates’ (Lavoie, 2008, p. 31). 
Admittedly, Piketty does not use the standard neoclassical theory of production, as his concept 
of capital is broader than that usually used by neoclassical economists (Rognlie, 2014; Rowthorn, 
2014). However, the problems of the aggregate production functions also extend to Piketty as 
far as he uses the concept. He does not refer to empirical estimates of the production function, 
but does claim that return to capital is technologically determined.27 If we can never identify an 
aggregate production function and we know that it cannot be derived from standard micro 
production functions, this is not a useful explanation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The present paper has presented some reservations regarding Piketty’s “fundamental 
contradiction of capitalism” from a post-Keynesian point of view. It has been argued, firstly, that 
                                                          
26
 For a detailed literature review on the subject, see Felipe & Fisher (2003, 2006). 
27
 Moreover, the empirical estimation of elasticities of substitution is empty of content, because as Fisher et al. (1977, 
p. 312) remind us: ‘the elasticity of substitution in these production functions is an “estimate” of nothing; there is no 
true aggregate parameter to which it corresponds.’ 
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the observation 𝑟 > 𝑔 is not simply an empirical matter. It emerges as a standard property of 
long-standing Cambridge growth models; even then it does not automatically entail a more 
uneven functional income distribution over time. Secondly, we have shown that Piketty falls 
victim to the fallacy of composition when he equates the overall macroeconomic rate of profit 
with the rate at which wealth grows. This simple logical mistake is the most serious objection to 
the theoretical structure of Capital in the Twenty-First Century, one that invalidates his claim 
that this inequality is necessarily tied to an increasing capital share in income. We have shown 
that, in fact, this inequality is compatible with an increasing, constant or decreasing profit share. 
Thirdly, we have explored how several of Piketty’s ideas on personal income distribution could 
be fruitfully incorporated into the Cambridge model. Finally, we have raised serious concerns 
about the validity of the neoclassical explanation of the determination of the rate of profit and 
income distribution (and Piketty’s use of these concepts) both theoretically and empirically. 
The rejection of specific theoretical arguments does not diminish the achievements of Piketty’s 
work. Capital has brought issues of wealth and income distribution to the centre stage of public 
discussion. It has also put together, and made readily available, an invaluable data set, and it 
allows future researchers to analyse macroeconomics in the context of a much broader time 
horizon, covering much of the history of capitalism rather than the last few decades. We 
suggest, however, that the analysis of the book would have been strengthened had Piketty 
developed it in a post-Keynesian framework alongside, or instead of, a neoclassical one. 
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